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Abstract. We construct a new protocol for attribute-based encryption
with the use of the modification of the standard secret sharing scheme. In
the suggested modification of the secret sharing scheme, only one master
key for each user is required that is achieved by linearly enlarging public
parameters in the access formula. We then use this scheme for designing
an attribute-based encryption protocol related to some access structure
in terms of attributes. We demonstrate that the universe of possible
attributes does not affect the resulting efficiency of the scheme. The
security proofs for both constructions are provided.
Keywords: secret sharing · attribute-based encryption · monotone ac-
cess structures
Abstract. We construct a new protocol for attribute-based encryption
with the use of the modification of the standard secret sharing scheme. In
the suggested modification of the secret sharing scheme, only one master
key for each user is required that is achieved by linearly enlarging public
parameters in access formula. We then use this scheme for designing
an attribute-based encryption protocol related to some access structure
in terms of attributes. We demonstrate that the universe of possible
attributes does not affect the resulting efficiency of the scheme. The
security proofs for both constructions are provided.
Keywords: Secret sharing · Attribute-based encryption · Monotone ac-
cess structures
1 Introduction
In the view of the significant increase in the amount of digital communications,
the problem of efficient protection of data becomes crucial. An important task is
to construct a secured protocol for controlled access to data. In standard proto-
cols for solving this problem, which are mostly based on public-key cryptography,
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a secret key is required for access to whole encrypted data. A straightforward
modifications of such protocols for providing partial access to data lead to a sig-
nificant increase of the complexity since multiple encryptions of the same data
are needed.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a relatively new approach for solving
the data access control problem [1–3]. In the ABE schemes, the access to the
parts of an encrypted data is determined by a set of attributes, which are inher-
ent to various participants. Thus, if attributes of a participant belonging to a
particular subset of possible attributes, then he is able to obtain access to a corre-
sponding particular part of the encrypted data. The ABE conception appears to
be very promising in a framework of cloud technologies and distributed ledgers.
Over the past decade, a number of modifications and improvements have been
presented [1, 4, 5]. However, some of the proposed approaches still suffer from
implementation complexity, which increases with the number of attributes.
We note that the concept of ABE has much in common with the secret
sharing (SS) problem. However, one of the most common SS schemes [6] has a
problem related to a large number of shares per trustee.
In this work, we propose an advanced ABE protocol with a sufficiently low
computational complexity. One of the main techniques of our work is a mod-
ification of the standard SS scheme, which allows one to use a single key for
generating the whole set of required shares. This modification is then used for
the construction of the ABE protocol, which is independent to the size of the
set of possible attributes.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2 we provide basic definitions. In
Sec. 3 we briefly describe the standard construction of the general SS scheme.
In Sec. 4 we present our modification of the SS scheme, which is then used for
constructing the ABE protocol in Sec. 5. In Sec. 6 we estimate the required re-
sources for encryption and decryption for the suggested protocol. We summarize
our results and conclude in Sec. 7.
2 Preliminaries
Let us introduce basic definitions and notations.
Let x ← X , where x is a random value and X is a probability distribution,
denote a sampling of x from the distribution X . Let y ← M(x), where M is
an algorithm, denote the output y of M processed on the input x. Let x
$
← X ,
where X is a set, denote an element x, which is chosen uniformly at random
from the set X . Let ∨(φ1, . . . , φn) and ∧(φ1, . . . , φn) stand for φ1 ∨ . . .∨ φn and
φ1 ∧ . . . ∧ φn, correspondingly.
Now we define a pseudorandom function (PRF) family. Given the oracle f ,
we denote M(f) as the execution of the oracle machine M with an access to f .
Definition 1 (pseudorandom function (PRF) family) We define FD→E =
{fk : D → E}k∈K, where |K| = |D| = |E| <∞ to be a function family. We define
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the advantage of an adversary A against PRF as
AdvPRFFD→E (A) = |Pr[1← A(fk) : k
$
← K]− Pr[1← A(h) : h
$
← HD→E ]|,
where HD→E is a family of all functions from D → E (|HD→E | = |E|
|D|). We
define the PRF insecurity of a function family FD→E against time-ξ adversaries
as the maximum advantage of any classical adversary that runs in time ξ :
InSecPRF(FD→E , ξ) = max
A
{AdvPRF
FD→E
(A)}
Definition 2 (m-PRF family game) We say that an oracle ω is initialized
with a function f(·) if ω(x) = f(x), and denote it as ω ← f . The following
procedure is called m-PRF family game
Init: Given FD→E = {fk : D → E}k∈K, where |K| = |D| = |E|, flip a fair
coin b. If b = 1 then Ω = {ωi ← fk : k
$
← K, i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}. Otherwise
Ω = {ωi ← h : h
$
← HD→E , i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}}, where HD→E is a family of all
functions from D → E.
Game: Given a set of oracles Ω, the challenge is to distinguish whether Ω is
initialized with functions from FD→E or from HD→E
We define the advantage of an adversary A against m-PRF as
Advm−PRF
FD→E
(A) = |Pr[1← A(Ω)|b = 1]− Pr[1← A(Ω)|b = 0]|.
We define the m-PRF insecurity of a function family FD→E against time-ξ ad-
versaries as the maximum advantage of any classical adversary that runs in time
ξ :
InSecm−PRF(FD→E , ξ) = max
A
{Advm−PRF
FD→E
(A)}
Definition 3 (Decisional DiffieHellman (DDH) challenge [10, 11]) Consider
a (multiplicative) cyclic group G of the order q with the generator g. We define
the advantage of an adversary A against DDH as
AdvDDHG (A) = |Pr(1← A(g
a, gb, gab)− Pr(1← A(ga, gb, gz))| (1)
where a, b, z are chosen randomly and independently from Zq. We define the DDH
insecurity of a group G against time-ξ adversaries as the maximum advantage
of any classical adversary that runs in time ξ :
InSecDDH(G, ξ) = max
A
{AdvDDHG (A)}
Definition 4 (m-DDH challenge) Consider a (multiplicative) cyclic group G
of the order q with the generator g, and following two distibutions:
– Ωab = {(g
a, gb1 , ga·b1), (ga, gb2 , ga·b2), . . . , (ga, gbm , ga·bm)}, where a and bi
are chosen randomly and independently from Zq for i = 1, . . . ,m,
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– Ωz = {(g
a, gb1 , gz1), (ga, gb2 , gz2), . . . , (ga, gbm , gzm)}, where a, bi, zi are cho-
sen randomly and independently from Zq for i = 1, . . . ,m,
We define the advantage of an adversary A against m-DDH as
Advm−DDHG (A) = |Pr[1← A(Ωab)]− Pr[1← A(Ωz)]| (2)
We define the DDH insecurity of a group G against time-ξ adversaries as the
maximum advantage of any classical adversary that runs in time ξ :
InSecm−DDH(G, ξ) = max
A
{Advm−DDHG (A)}
Definition 5 Let P = {P1, . . . Pn} be a set. An access structure B is a collection
of non-empty subsets of P, i.e., B ⊆ 2P .
Definition 6 Given a set P, a monotone access structure on P is a collection
of subsets B ⊆ 2P such that
B ∈ B, B ⊆ B′ ⊆ P ⇒ B′ ∈ B.
Definition 7 A Boolean function Φ : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} is called monotone, if
Φ(x1, . . . , xn) ≤ Φ(x
′
1, . . . , x
′
n), whenever for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} xi ≤ x
′
i.
Definition 8 Given an access structure B, define a Boolean function ΦB :
{0, 1}|P | → {0, 1} on |P|-bit strings, where each bit is indexed by an element
from P, such that Φ(x) = 1 iff {p : xp = 1} ∈ B.
One can look at the Boolean function ΦB as an indicator of the set B. It is
easy to check that the defined ΦB is a monotone Boolean function for a proper
monotone access structure B.
Definition 9 For a given set P and a monotone access structure B on P, de-
fine F(B) to be the set of all Boolean formulae (expressions consisted of logical
operations) on |P | variables, such that for every formula φ ∈ F(B) the output
of φ is true iff the true variables in φ correspond exactly to a set B ∈ B (here
we assume that each Boolean variable in the formula is indexed with an element
form P).
We note that φ, φ′ ∈ F(B) implies that φ and φ′ correspond to the same
function ΦB. They may, however, represent entirely different formula to express
this function.
Definition 10 (Random oracle [12]) Random oracle is an oracle (a theoret-
ical black box) that responds to every unique query with a value chosen uniformly
at random from its output domain. If a query is repeated, it responds the same
way every time that query is submitted. We refer a set of independent Random
Oracles, {RO1, . . . ,ROt}, as a family of Random Oracles.
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3 Standard construction of the general SS scheme
We begin our consideration with a SS scheme, which is proposed by J. Benaloh
and J. Leichter [6], that we refer to as a standard SS scheme. For this purpose we
first introduce a definition of the secure generalized SS scheme. It is known that
for certain access structures every secure generalized SS scheme must be able to
assign multiple shares to each trustee (see Theorem 2 below). In this case, we
use sp,j to denote the j
th share given to trustee p.
We define the scheme with the use of the following roles. We call the dealer,
a user who shares a secret according to some access structure. The trustees are
users among which the secret is shared. A party is a group of trustees. We denote
the set of all trustees as P .
Definition 11 (Secure generalized SS scheme) Given a monotone access
structure B on a set of trusties P and a set of possible secrets S, a secure gen-
eralized SS scheme for B is a method of dividing a secret s ∈ S into shares
{sp,j}p∈P,j∈N such that
– for every B ∈ B, there is an algorithm for reconstructing the secret s from
the subset of shares ∪
p∈B
∪
j
sp,j;
– for every B /∈ B the subset of shares ∪
p∈B
∪
j
sp,j provides no information (in
an information theoretic sense) about the value of s.
In what is presented below, we define the secret domain S = Zq, for some pos-
itive integer q. We then are able to construct the secure generalized SS scheme.
It is known that every monotone function Φ can represented with a formula
φ consisted only of ∧ and ∨ operations (without NOT operation). It is then
sufficient to demonstrate how to divide a secret “across” these two operators.
We use Xp,j to denote the j
th appearance of variable Xp : p ∈ P in a formula
φ. We refer it as j-notation. For example, a formula (X1 ∧ X2) ∨ (X1 ∧ X3)
transforms to (X1,1 ∧X2,1) ∨ (X1,2 ∧X3,1)
Let $(s, φ) be a random function, which declares shares for each trustee p ∈ P
for s ∈ S and a monotone formula φ, that is defined as follows (we assume that
φ is represented in j-notation):
– $(s′, Xp,j) assigns the share s
′ to trustee p ∈ P , such that sp,j := s
′;
– $(s′,∨(φ1, . . . , φn)) = ∪
1≤i≤n
$(s, φi);
– $(s,∧(φ1, . . . , φn)) = ∪
1≤i≤n
$(si, φi), where the si are chosen uniformly from
S, such that s = (
∑n
i=1 si)(mod q).
It is then possible to show that for every monotone access structure B, the
SS scheme defined by $(s, φ) satisfies the definition of a secure generalized SS
scheme.
Theorem 1. Let B be a monotone access structure on a set P, φ ∈ F(B) such
that it is represented in j-notaition and contains only operators ∧ and ∨, and let
s be a secret from Zq. The SS scheme determined by $(s, φ) is a secure generalized
SS scheme for B.
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Finally, we note that it is shown in [6] that there are access structures, which
cannot be realized without giving multiple (or extra large) shares to some trustee.
Theorem 2. There exist access structures for which any generalized SS scheme
must give some trustee shares which are from a domain larger than that of the
secret.
See [6] for the proofs of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
4 Advanced SS scheme
4.1 General idea
As it is noted in [6], that we are unable to realize most monotone access structures
with a standard SS scheme. However, one can modify the structures that can
be realized efficiently, such that each trustee holds only one secret value, which
we refer as a master key. With the use of the master key, a trustee is able to
calculate all required shares.
We define the scheme with the use of the roles as defined above.
Let us begin with an illustrative example. Assume that a dealer wants to
share a secret s ∈ Zq between trustees Alice (A), Bob (B), Charlie (C), and
David (D) according to the following access formula:
((XA,1 ∧XB,1) ∨ (XB,2 ∧XC,1) ∨ (XC,2 ∧XD,1)), (3)
where Xp,j is a Boolean variable that represents a trustee p and appeared j
th
time in the formula. Let us introduce an address for each variable as its position
in the formula as follows:
((
0
XA,1 ∧
1
XB,1) ∨ (
2
XB,2 ∧
3
XC,1) ∨ (
4
XC,2 ∧
5
XD,1)) (4)
Thus, XA,1.address = 0, XB,1.address = 1, XB,2.address = 2, and so on.
To share a secret, the dealer first gives each trustee p ∈ {A,B,C,D} a value
mkp, which is chosen uniformly at random from some domain K. Next we refer
to mkp as a master key belonging to a trustee p.
Let us then assume that the dealer and trustees have access to independent
random oracles family {ROi : i ∈ Zq} with an output domain in Zq. In order to
generate a share that corresponds to a variable Xp,j, a trustee p has to query the
random oracle ROmkp with Xp,j .address. For example, the shares for the defined
access formula are computed in this way:
sA,1 = ROmkA(XA,1.address) = ROmkA(0),
sB,1 = ROmkB (XB,1.address) = ROmkB (1),
sB,2 = ROmkB (XB,2.address) = ROmkB (2),
sC,1 = ROmkC (XC,1.address) = ROmkC (3), (5)
sC,2 = ROmkC (XC,2.address) = ROmkC (4),
sD,1 = ROmkD(XD,1.address) = ROmkD (5).
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Since each random oracle is independent, every share is a random value from
Zq. As a result, a sum of shares, e.g. s
′ := (sA,1 + sB,2)(mod q), is also a
uniformly random variable from Zq. To make it possible to reconstruct a secret
s by trustees A and B, we add a publicly known value y1 to this bracket, such
that (y1 + s
′)(mod q) = s.
Consequently, we modify our access formula into the following form:
((
0
XA,1 ∧
1
XB,1 ∧Y1) ∨ (
2
XB,2 ∧
3
XC,3 ∧Y2) ∨ (
4
XC,2 ∧
5
XD,1 ∧Y3)), (6)
where Yi are Boolean variables that correspond to fictitious trustees, whose
shares yi are considered to be publicly known to every actual trustee. The value
of yi is computed in such a way that a reconstruction of secret becomes possible.
We note that yi is computed by the dealer, since he knows all the master keys.
Below we present our scheme in a more formal and efficient way.
4.2 Formal Construction
Let n be a security parameter, Fq = {fk : k ∈ K} be a PRF family, where q ≥ 2
n
and fk : Zq → Zq with |K| = q. Here we chose fk : D → E with D = Zq, but
one can choose another domain. Note that E = Zq, so we are able to sum the
shares in Zq. Let Hq be a family of all functions Zq → Zq. Let l = poly(n) be the
maximum size of monotone formula that we can use efficiently and let l′ := l/2.
Hereby the size of the monotone formula is the number of times that variables
occur in the formula.
The roles for the scheme (dealer, trustees, and party) are defined in the pre-
vious subsection.
First, we define a modifying function gs(φ), where φ is an access formula,
whose size is less than l′ + 1 and it is written in j-notation, and s ∈ Zq. Let
Xp,j be a variable, which represents a trustee p and it is appeared j
th time
in the formula. Let Xp,j .address represents the position of the variable in φ.
Let mkp ∈ K be the value of p’s master key. We denote Yi as a variable that
corresponds to a fictitious trustee and yi as the value of his share. We use φi as
subformula. Since every formula can be written in the following form:
◦ (φ1, φ2, . . . , φj , Xp1,k1 , Xp2,k2 , . . .Xpt,kt), (7)
where ◦ stands for either ∧ or ∨.
Let is introduce a global counter α, which is initialized with 1. There are
three separate cases to look at:
– gs(Xp1,k1 ∧ . . . ∧Xpt,kt) = (Xp1,k1 ∧ . . . ∧Xpt,kt ∧ Yα),
where t ≥ 1 and yi = s−fmkp1 (Xp1,k1 .address)−. . .−fmkpt (Xpt,kt .address)(mod q),
and the counter α is incremented α := α+ 1.
– gs(Xp1,k1 ∧ . . .∧Xpt,kt ∧φ1∧ . . .∧φj) = (Xp1,k1 ∧ . . .∧Xpt,kt ∧gs1 (φ1)∧ . . .∧
gsj (φj)), where j ≥ 1, φi = ∨(·) with at least one operator, si
$
← Zq for i ∈
{1, . . . , j−1} and sj := s−fmkp1 (Xp1,k1 .address)−. . .−fmkpt (Xpt,kt .address)−
s1 − . . .− sj−1 (mod q).
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– gs(Xp1,k1 ∨ . . . ∨ Xpt,kt ∨ φ1 ∨ . . . ∨ φj) = (gs(Xp1,k1) ∨ . . . ∨ gs(Xpt,kt) ∨
gs(φ1) ∨ gs(φ2) ∨ . . . ∨ gs(φj)).
Let us clarify that the address of a variable is the number of the position of
that variable in the formula φ (conventionally, we count from left to right).
Now we can describe our advanced SS scheme. To share a secret the dealer
should follow these steps:
1. Choose a secret s
$
← Zq.
2. Choose a master key for each trustee in the union P uniformly at random
from K (for each p ∈ P : mkp
$
← K).
3. Choose a monotone formula φ of size less or equal to l′, which represents an
access structure.
4. Evaluate φ′ = gs(φ).
5. Publish φ′, so that the values yi are available for everyone.
To reconstruct a secret a party should follow these steps:
1. Each trustee p in the party has to evaluate their shares:
sp,j = fmkp(Xp,j .address).
2. Using the corresponding shares and public values yi, a verified party can
calculate the secret s according to the way it is shared.
Definition 12 Given a set P and a monotone access structure B on P, an
advanced SS scheme for B is a method of dividing a secret s into shares sp,j
such that the following statements hold true:
– When B ∈ B, the secret s can be reconstructed from the shares ∪
p∈B
∪
j
sp,j
and public values y1, . . . , yt.
– When B /∈ B, the secret s can be reconstructed only with a negligible proba-
bility from the shares ∪
p∈B
∪
j
sp,j and public values y1, . . . , yt.
4.3 Security proof
Here we introduce a notion of the security model that is used for our scheme,
which is similar to the Selective-Id model [7–9].
Definition 13 (Selective-Id model for advanced SS scheme) The follow-
ing procedure is called Selective-Id model for advanced SS scheme.
Init: The adversary chooses an access structure B with a corresponding formula
φ and gives it to the challenger.
Phase 1: The adversary declares the set of trustees γ, which does not satisfy the
formula φ and obtains master keys of trustees from γ from the challenger.
Challenge: The adversary submits two secrets s0 and s1. The challenger flips
a fair coin b and shares the secret sb.
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Phase 2: The challenger gives to the adversary φ′ = gsb(φ) and corresponding
values y1, . . . , yj.
Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
The advantage of an adversary in this game is defined as |Pr[b′ = b]− 1
2
|.
Theorem 3. Consider the advanced SS scheme for a set of parties P based on
PRF family Fq = {fk : Zq → Zq}k∈K with |K| = q. The advantage ε
′ in the
Selective-Id model of any classical adversary A that runs in time ξ′ satisfies the
inequality ε′ ≤ InSecPRF(Fq, ξ) · |P|, where ξ
′ ≈ ξ assuming that time needed
for sampling no more than |P|+ l′ random variables is negligible, where l′ is the
maximum size of the formula which can be efficiently processed by the advanced
SS scheme.
Proof. First of all, one can easily notice that the reconstruction of the secret
happens the same way as in the standard SS scheme. We also note that if B /∈ B
(i.e. B does not satisfy the formula φ), then B∪ (∪
i
Yi) does not satisfy the access
structure defined by φ′ = gs(φ) as Xp,j ∧ 1 = Xp,j.
Consider, a modification of the advanced SS scheme (modified advanced SS
scheme), where PRF family Fq is replaced with a set of random oracles. One
can see that this scheme is exactly the standard SS scheme based on formula
φ′ = gs(φ). So there is no chance for an adversary to compute the secret, which
possesses the shares from B /∈ B.
Now suppose that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time adversary
A, which has an advantage ε′ in Selective-Id model for advanced SS scheme.
Without loss of generality, we assume that it’s probability of guessing a correct
value is Pr[b′ = b] = 1/2+ ε′. Then we show that it is possible to distinguish the
PRF family Fq from truly random function family with a probability at least
ε′/|P|. To show this we construct an oracle machineMA that has an advantage
ε′ in |P|-pseudorandom function family game (see Algorithm 1). Let us calculate
the probabilities to obtain v′ = 0 and v′ = 1 (v′ is defined in Algorithm 1).
Suppose that the challenge Ω is initialised with functions from the family Fq.
In this case, the situation for the adversary is completely the same as in the case
of the (non-modified) advanced SS scheme. Therefore, the adversary correctly
guesses the value b′ with an advantage ε′ or what is the same with probability
1
2
+ ε′.
If the challenge Ω is initialized with functions from the family Hq, then the
shares of the trustees from P \ γ are chosen uniformly at random. And the
situation is the same as in the standard SS scheme. Since γ does not satisfy the
formula, it is required to obtain at least one more share to get the secret, but
all the remaining shares are chosen uniformly at random. Therefore, according
to the Theorem 1 the adversary has no information about the secret in this
situation. Thus, in this case the adversary can only randomly guess the value b,
so b′ is correctly guessed with a probability 1
2
.
Let v = 0 corresponds to the challenge Ω initialized with functions from the
family Hq and v = 1 to the challenge Ω initialized with functions from the pseu-
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Algorithm 1: MA
Input : Security parameter n, function family Fq, |P|-pseudorandom function
family challenge Ω = {ωp1 , . . . , ωpN }, where {p1, . . . , pN} = P .
Output: A guess v′.
The adversary A declares an access structure, a corresponding formula φ, and a
set of trustees γ, which does not satisfy the formula φ.
A queries the master keys of trustees from γ.
Generate a master key uniformly at random for each trustee in γ and response
to the adversary with those keys.
The adversary submits two secrets s0 and s1.
Flip a fair coin b and share the secret sb according to the advanced SS scheme,
but instead of generating master keys for trustees in P \ γ and calculating the
shares with fk ∈ Fq, use an oracle ωp from Ω for trustee p ∈ P \ γ and
calculate the shares as sp.j = ωp(Xp.j .address). We call this modification g
′
s(φ).
Give to the adversary φ′ = g′sb(φ) and corresponding values y1, . . . , yj .
The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
if b′ = b then
return v′ = 1
else
return v′ = 0
dorandom function family. Then the overall advantage in the |P|-pseudorandom
game is |Pr[v′ = 1|v = 0]− Pr[v′ = 1|v = 1]| = | 1
2
− (1
2
+ ε′)| = ε′.
By the hybrid argument [13] we can distinguish a pseudorandom function
family with probability ε′/(|P|). In order to apply the hybrid argument consider
two distributions,
D1 = {D1.i = fk : k
$
← K, 1 ≤ i ≤ |P|, fk ∈ Fq}, (8)
and
D2 = {D2.i = h
$
← Hq : 1 ≤ i ≤ |P|}. (9)
Define a sequence of hybrid distributions D1 = T0, T1, . . . , T|P| = D2, where
Ti = {Ti.j = h
$
← Hq : 1 ≤ j ≤ i} ∪ {Ti.j = fk : k
$
← K, i < j ≤ |P|, fk ∈ Fq}.
So we have AdvD1,D2(M
A) = ε′. Let us remind that
AdvTi,Ti+1(M
A) = |Pr[x
$
← Ti :M
A(x) = 1]−
− Pr[x
$
← Ti+1 :M
A(x) = 1]| (10)
By the triangle inequality, it is clear that
AdvD1,D2(M
A) ≤
|P|−1∑
i=0
AdvTi,Ti+1(M
A)
Thus, there exists some η, such that 0 ≤ η < |P| and
AdvTη ,Tη+1(M
A) ≥ AdvD1,D2(M
A)/|P| = ε′/|P|. (11)
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Suppose that we have a sample ω
$
← Fq or ω
$
← Hq. Let us construct a distri-
bution T ′ = {Ti
$
← Hq : 1 ≤ i ≤ η} ∪ {Tη+1 = ω} ∪ {Ti ← fk : k
$
← K, η + 1 <
i ≤ |P|, fk ∈ Fq}. If ω
$
← Fq then T
′ is distributed the same as Tη, otherwise it
is distributed as Tη+1. Thus, we can distinguish samples from Fq and Hq with
probability ε′/|P|.
Finally, we obtain: ε′ ≤ InSecPRF(Fq, ξ) · |P|, where ξ is a total time of
running MA plus initialization of an appropriate hybrid. Neglegting the time
needed for preparing data for A and the hybrid T ′ we obtain ξ ≈ ξ′.
5 Advanced ABE Scheme
5.1 Formal Construction
Consider a group of users, where each user posses a list of attributes. Let P be a
set of all existing attributes. Let us call a community a subgroup of users, who
possess a particular attribute p ∈ P . In what follows, we refer to the community
p as a subgroup of users that possess an attribute p. We note that a user can
belong to several communities if he has more than one attribute.
Let n ∈ N be a security parameter, G be a multiplicative group of a prime
order q, where 2n < q < 2n+1 in which DDH assumption is considered to be
true, g is a generator of that group, Hq is a family of all functions Zq → Zq,
and Fq = {fk : Zq → Zq}k∈G is a PRF family. We construct the advanced ABE
scheme based on the advanced SS scheme in the following form.
Setup: Each community p in the universe P generates their secret key skp
$
← Zq
and a correspong public key pk = gskp . Then the public key is shared among
the whole group of users. So that the set of public keys PK = {pkp = g
skp :
p ∈ P} is assumed to be known to every user in the group.
Encryption (M,PK, φ,Fq): To encrypt a message M ∈ Zq under public keys
PK and formula φ, which represents some monotone access structure, one
generates s
$
← Zq, e
$
← Zq and computes the ciphertext in the following form
E = {E′ = M + s(mod q), ge, φ′ = gs(φ), y1, . . . , yt}, where gs(·), y1, . . . , yt
come from the advanced SS scheme based on PRF family Fq and the corre-
sponding master keys are calculated as mkp = g
skp·e.
Decryption (E, SK,Attr,Fq): , where SK is a set of all secret keys known to a
concrete user and Attr is a set of attributes he posseses. For each skp ∈ SK,
a user calculates the master key mkp = (g
e)skp . Then if Attr satisfies the
access structure, then the secret s can be reconstructed usingMK = {mkp},
φ′ and y1, . . . , yt. The message is obtained from E
′ as M = E′ − s(mod q).
5.2 Security proof
In order to provide a formal security analysis of the advanced ABE scheme, we
introduce the following definition.
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Definition 14 (Attribute-based Selective-Set model) The following
procedure is called attribute-based Selective-Set model:
Init: The adversary chooses an access structure and a corresponding formula φ
and sends φ to the challenger.
Phase 1: The adversary declares the set of communities γ, which does not sat-
isfy the formula φ and obtains secret keys of communities from γ from the
challenger.
Challenge: The adversary submits two secrets s0 and s1. The challenger flips
a fair coin b and encrypts m
$
← Zq: E
′ = m+ sb(mod q).
Phase 2: The challenger gives to the adversary public keys of all communities
and E, which is a ciphertext of m generated according to the advanced ABE
scheme.
Guess: The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
The advantage of an adversary in this game is defined as |Pr[b′ = b]− 1
2
|.
Below we prove that the security of our scheme in the attribute-based Selective-
Set model reduces to the hardness of the DDH challenge and pseudorandomness
of the function family.
Theorem 4. Consider the advanced ABE scheme based on an PRF family Fq
and set of communities P. The advantage ε′ in the the Attribute-based Selective-
Set model game of any classical adversary A that runs in time ξ′ satisfies the
following inequality: ε′ ≤ InSecDDH(G, ξ) · |P|+ InSecPRF(Fq, ξ˜) · |P|. With ξ ≈
ξ′ ≈ ξ˜ assuming that time required for sampling no more than 3|P|+ l′ random
variables is negligible, where l′ is the maximum size of the formula which can be
efficiently processed by the advanced ABE scheme.
Proof. First, suppose that the master keys are replaced with uniformly random
keys. In this case, let us denote the advantage in breaking the modified advanced
ABE protocol in the attribute-based Selective-Set model as ε˜. If (ε′ − ε˜) is not
negligible, then we can construct a machine that breaks |P|-DDH challenge with
an advantage of at least (ε′ − ε˜).
We assume that ε˜ < ε′, since we limit the value of ε˜ by the pseudoradnomnes
property and if ε′ is less than ε˜ then we can limit them both.
Let us denote a |P|-DDH challenge Ω = {wp1 , . . . , wpN }, whereN = |P|,
{p1, . . . , pN} = P and wpi is a tuple either (g
a, gbi , ga·bi) or (ga, gbi , gzi). We use
wi.j to denote the j
th element of the tuple. To prove the theorem, consider the
following algorithm.
If ωp.3 is sampled uniformly at random (v = 0), then the master keys are
chosen uniformly at random. Hence the adversary has no information about
the master keys he did not query. Remind that we denote the advantage of the
adversary in this situation as ε˜. Otherwise (v = 1) the situation is the same as in
the original ABE protocol. Thus, we have the overall advantage in the |P|-DDH
game as follows:
Advanced attribute-based protocol 13
Algorithm 2: MA
Input : Security parameter n, |P|-DDH challenge Ω.
Output: A guess v′.
The adversary A chooses an access structure and a corresponding formula φ
and sends it to the challenger.
A declares the set of communities γ, which does not satisfy the formula φ,
whose secret keys he wishes to get and queries them.
Generate a secret key for each community in γ and response to the adversary
with those keys.
The adversary submits two secrets s0 and s1.
Flip a fair coin b and encrypt a message m
$
← Zq according to the advanced
ABE scheme with s = sb, but instead of secret keys for communities in P \ γ
use sample ωp from Ω for community p ∈ P \ γ. Take ωp.2 as his public key
and ωp.3 as his master key. We call this modification g
′
s(F ).
Give to the adversary E = {E′ = m+ s(mod q), ω1,1, φ
′ = g′s(φ), y1, . . . , yj}.
The adversary outputs a guess b′ of b.
if b′ = b then
return v′ = 1
else
return v′ = 0
InSec|P|−DDH(G, ξP ) ≥ |Pr[v
′ = 1|v = 0]− Pr[v′ = 1|v = 1]| =
= |(
1
2
+ ε˜)− (
1
2
+ ε′)| = ε′ − ε˜, (12)
where ξP is a running time of Algorithm 2. Neglegting the time for preparing
data for A we obtain ξP ≈ ξ
′.
In analogy to the proof of Theorem 3, one can see that due to the hybrid
argument
InSecDDH(G, ξ) ≥ (ε′ − ε˜)/|P|,
where ξ ≈ ξP neglegting the time, needed to prepare an appropriate hybrid.
Finally, we limit the value of ε˜. Due to the fact the master keys are chosen
uniformly at random, the security of such a scheme reduces to the security of
the advanced SS scheme straightforwardly. Therefore, according to Theorem 3:
ε˜ ≤ InSecPRF(Fq, ξ˜) · |P|, with ξ˜ ≈ ξP .
Thus, we arrive to the final result:
ε′ ≤ InSecDDH(G, ξ) · |P|+ InSecPRF(Fq, ξ˜) · |P|,
with ξ′ ≈ ξ ≈ ξ˜.
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6 Efficiency estimation for advanced ABE scheme
Here we analyze the efficiency of the proposed advanced ABE scheme in terms
of sizes of ciphertext, public parameters, and private key, and the computation
time for decryption and encryption.
Consider a ciphertext E = {E′ = m + s(mod q), ge, φ′ = gs(φ), y1, . . . , yj}
and a plaintext PT = {m,φ}. We note that it is required to publish the rules
of the access structure, hence we assume that the plaintext is accomplished by
the formula φ. One can see that φ′ is no more than twice bigger than φ. This is
due to the fact that the number of additional Boolean variables corresponded to
fictitious trustees (communities) can not exceed the number of Boolean variables
corresponded to the actual trustees (communities). We then note that φ and φ′
make a major contribution into the size of PT and E. Hence, the overhead of the
ciphertext compared to plaintext is of the size linear in the size of the formula
φ.
The public parameters of the system are of size linear in the number of
existing attributes. The private key of the community consists of a single value
from Zq.
The encryption procedure generates two random values, performs one addi-
tion in Zq and one exponentiation in the group G, l calls to functions from Fq,
where l denotes the size of the formula φ. The modification of the formula φ into
φ′ is performed in the linear time with the usage of syntax tree.
Thus, the amount of the communities in the scheme is |P|. The decryption
procedure needs to perform at most |P| exponentiations, l′ sums and pseudo-
random function calls, where l′ is the size of formula φ′. Finally, one subtraction
is required.
7 Conclusion
Here we summarize the main results of our work. First, we have presented the
modification of the SS scheme, which allows a user to store only one value to
calculate the corresponding shares. Based on this modification, we have pro-
posed the advanced ABE protocol. We have provided the security and efficiency
analysis of the proposed scheme.
One of the most significant impacts of this paper is rejection of bilinear
mappings, which evidently increases the efficiency of the proposed scheme and
allows to dimamicaly add new attributes.
One can see that the proposed ABE scheme is not collusion resistant as well
as some other ABE schemes (e.g. see [14]). We note, that all known collusion
resistant schemes are based on using of trusted centers which are absent in our
scheme.
There are several ways to improve the proposed scheme. The first one is
based on adding new logical elements, e.g. threshold, so that the formula φ can
be constructed more efficiently. The second question is related to modification
of this protocol with respect to the use of other key exchange schemes.
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